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HOW I LOST MY CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 
SANFORD LEVINSON∗
INTRODUCTION  
 
What follows is the revised text of a lecture delivered at the 92nd 
St. Y in New York City on April 26, 2012, under the title “How I Lost 
My Constitutional Faith.”  It is obviously linked, in many ways, to the 
themes raised by Jack Balkin in his splendid book Constitutional Re-
demption.1  This, of course, is not altogether surprising inasmuch as 
Jack was kind enough to dedicate his book to me in part on the basis 
of the contribution to his own thought of some of the ideas in my 
1988 book, Constitutional Faith; that book was brought out in a new 
edition by the Princeton University Press in 2011 with a new afterword 
that touches on some of the themes developed below.2
There are many aspects of Jack’s book that are worth elaborating, 
and the other essays in this symposium certainly do so, though, just as 
certainly, they don’t exhaust everything that might be said.  I suppose 
that the Essay that follows is linked most importantly to Jack’s empha-
sis that a constitution, if it is truly to structure the political life of the 
United States, must be “our” Constitution, in the sense that even as we 
recognize its inevitable imperfections, we still feel a measure of ge-
nuine veneration for it.
   
3  Moreover, the imperfections can ultimately 
be overcome by a “redemptive” project that requires fulfillment of 
what is best within the Constitution.4
 
Copyright © 2012 by Sanford Levinson. 
  No revolutionary transforma-
tion—or, perhaps, even significant formal amendment—may be ne-
cessary.   
∗ W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, Univer-
sity of Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin. 
 1. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST 
WORLD (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION]. 
 2. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 245–56 (rev. ed. 2011) (1988). 
 3. See BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 1, at 79 (“Even if one does 
not put one’s faith in the rule of law, one might still have faith that the particular set of 
legal institutions called the American Constitution is destined to work itself pure over 
time.”). 
 4. See id. at 29 (“In every generation it is given to us to redeem the promises of the 
Declaration and the Constitution in ever new ways.”). 
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Jack may be considerably more devoted to the Constitution than 
I currently am.  As H.W. Perry suggests in his own essay,5 I may be in 
the position of calling for a truly basic (structural) “reformation,” al-
beit one based on the admirable vision set out in the Preamble, while 
Jack perhaps believes that the constitutional church can be adequate-
ly changed from within without radically changing the structures in 
which our dysfunctional political system operates.  Both of us agree, 
though, that redemption, however defined, can be achieved by com-
mitment to its immanent possibilities.  Mark Graber, in his own valua-
ble contribution,6
HOW I LOST MY CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 
 suggests that both Jack and myself may be too 
“prophetic” inasmuch as we focus on only selective aspects of the 
Constitution—e.g., the striving for (perfect?) justice—and downplay 
the equally important emphasis on a vision of “domestic tranquility” 
that may require honoring quite rotten compromises made with 
people of fundamentally differing views regarding the meaning of jus-
tice.  In any event, this Essay is designed not only to offer one way of 
approaching Constitutional Redemption, but also to serve as the next ex-
change in the ongoing conversations with the co-dedicatees of my re-
cent book Framed, my invaluable friend, sometime colleague, and 
happily frequent co-author Jack Balkin, and my equally invaluable 
friend and interlocutor Mark Graber. 
Consider two recent comments about American politics and the 
Constitution.  The first is the conclusion of Tom Friedman’s column 
in the New York Times on April 22, 2012, one of many in which he ex-
presses great concern about the health of our political system.7  He 
began by asking what some readers no doubt found an inflammatory 
question: “Does America need an Arab Spring?”8  His answer is basi-
cally yes.  “We can’t be great,” concluded Friedman, “as long as we 
remain a vetocracy rather than a democracy. Our deformed political 
system—with a Congress that’s become a forum for legalized bri-
bery—is now truly holding us back.”9
 
 5. H.W. Perry, Jr., Constitutional Faith, Constitutional Redemption, and Political Science: 
Can Faith and Political Science Coexist?, 71 MD. L. REV. 1098 (2012). 
  A “vetocracy” allows what some 
would call “special interests” to prevent the passage of legislation both 
 6. Mark A. Graber, Redeeming and Living With Evil, 71 MD. L. REV. 1073 (2012). 
 7. Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., Down with Everything, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2012, at 
SR11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/opinion/sunday/friedman-down-
with-everything.html. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
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supported by majorities of the electorate and in fact conducive to 
some notion of the “public interest.”  A major point of this Essay is to 
suggest that the United States Constitution increasingly constitutes a 
clear and present danger to our polity, in part, but not only, because 
of its “vetocratic” aspects.  
It is, therefore, appropriate that the second statement was deli-
vered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in January when she was visiting 
Egypt and speaking to students there.  Asked by the English-speaking 
interviewer whether she thought Egypt should use the constitutions of 
other countries as a model, Justice Ginsburg said Egyptians should be 
“aided by all constitution-writing that has gone on since the end of 
World War II.”10
I would not look to the U.S. Constitution if I were drafting a 
constitution in the year 2012.  I might look at the Constitu-
tion of South Africa.  That was a deliberate attempt to have a 
fundamental instrument of government that embraced basic 
human rights, had an independent judiciary. . . . It really is, I 
think, a great piece of work that was done.  Much more re-
cent than the U.S. Constitution.
  That is innocent enough.  What inflamed many con-
servative pundits in the United States was her additional comment:  
11
She is absolutely correct.  The United States Constitution has in-
creasingly become an anti-model for those drafting constitutions in 
recent years, and it is important to understand why—and, perhaps, to 
ask what they know that we seem unwilling even to consider.   
   
I have a particular lens through which I view statements like 
Friedman’s and Ginsburg’s.  In 1986–87 I wrote a book called Consti-
tutional Faith.12  It was, in some sense, an extended meditation on 
Barbara Jordan’s famous statement, speaking to the nation from her 
position as a member of the committee considering the impeachment 
of Richard Nixon in 1974: “My faith in the Constitution is whole, it is 
complete, it is total. And I am not going to sit here and be an idle 
spectator to the diminution, the subversion, the destruction, of the 
Constitution.”13
 
 10. Ariane de Vogue, Ginsburg Likes S. Africa as Model for Egypt, ABC NEWS (Feb. 3, 
2012, 11:33 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/02/ginsburg-likes-s-africa-
as-model-for-egypt/.  The Supreme Court has not released a transcript of Justice Gins-
burg’s remarks, but the full video of her speech and interview with Egyptian television is 
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzog2QWiVaA, and excerpts of the tran-
script are available at http://www.memritv.org/clip_transcript/en/3295.htm.   
  Using Balkin’s terminology, there was no doubt 
 11. De Vogue, supra note 10. 
 12. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988). 
 13. BARBARA JORDAN, SPEAKING THE TRUTH WITH ELOQUENT THUNDER 27 (Max Sher-
man ed., 2007). 
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whatsoever that for Rep. Jordan, the United States Constitution was 
most certainly her Constitution, and that she saw within it the path to-
ward overcoming its degradation by President Nixon. 
I was interested in the use of religious language to describe one’s 
relationship to what is, after all, a secular document.  What does it 
mean to express such a total “faith in the Constitution,” and why 
would one have it?  Why would it not be regarded as a form of idola-
try, attributing divine-like status to a document written by decidedly 
imperfect men and creating an obviously non-divine, highly imperfect 
political order?  (Think only of what Israeli philosopher Avashai Mar-
galit has termed the “rotten compromises” regarding slavery,14
Exaggerated notions of “constitutional faith” have scarcely disap-
peared from our contemporary discourse.  One finds it most notably 
in many members of the so-called Tea Party, at least some of whom 
view the Constitution as touched with divinity.  A November 2009 ar-
ticle in the New York Times Magazine about Dick Armey, the former 
majority leader of the House Republicans who has become a major 
organizer of the Tea Party, described Armey’s reverence for the Con-
stitution.
 a reali-
ty of our constitutional history that Rep. Jordan was clearly aware of.)  
But an important aspect of American political culture is the expres-
sion of “constitutional faith” as the core of American civil religion.  
What made Justice Ginsburg’s statement so shocking to some was the 
degree to which she seemed to be engaging in heresy.  She seems not 
only to be suggesting that constitution-drafters in other countries bas-
ically ignore the United States Constitution, but also implying that she 
herself regards the Constitution as less admirable than the South 
African constitution drafted in 1994.   
15  For him it is “something like a sacred religious text, writ-
ten by Christian believers, possibly divinely inspired and intended to 
be read in the most literal way. It contains solutions to any civic prob-
lem faced by modern Americans.”16  “What should be your guide?” 
asked Armey in one speech.  “The Constitution.  This ain’t no thin-
kin’ thing.”17
 
 14. See AVISHAI MARGALIT, ON COMPROMISE AND ROTTEN COMPROMISES 1–2 (2009) 
(arguing that rotten political compromises, such as agreements to establish or maintain an 
inhuman regime, should not be allowed, even for the sake of peace). 
  One could easily understand why Samuel G. Freedman, 
who writes a regular column on religion for the New York Times, wrote, 
very shortly after Election Day in November 2010, of the “religious 
 15. Michael Sokolove, The Outsider’s Insider, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Nov. 8, 2009, at 24, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/08/magazine/08Armey-t.html. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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fervor for [the] Constitution”18 found in many devotees of the Tea 
Party.  He quoted James Manship, an ordained minister as well as a 
veteran of the United States Navy, who spoke of the Constitution in 
terms of “divine providence, intuitive intervention, or something like 
that,” and said,  “God’s words, the concept of godly government, are 
woven into the warp and woof of the fabric of our nation and this 
Constitution. It’s rightly called the ‘Miracle in Philadelphia.’”19  Not 
by coincidence, Miracle at Philadelphia is the hagiographic treatment 
of the Convention by Catherine Drinker Bowen that has remained in 
print, readily available, ever since its publication in 1966.20
For what it is worth, this view of the Constitution is basically held 
by the Mormon Church.  The former President of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter Day Saints, Ezra Taft Benson (who had been Secretary 
of Agriculture under President Eisenhower), delivered a talk in 1987 
on “Our Divine Constitution.”
  The title 
feeds a perception that the Constitution was written by “demigods,” 
perhaps even taking advantage of providential intervention.   
21
“I established the Constitution of this land,” said the Lord, 
“by the hands of wise men whom I raised up unto this very 
purpose.” 
  Citing relevant Mormon foundation-
al documents, he said,  
 For centuries the Lord kept America hidden in the hollow 
of His hand until the time was right to unveil her for her 
destiny in the last days.  “It is wisdom that this land should 
be kept as yet from the knowledge of other nations,” said 
Lehi, “for behold, many nations would overrun the land, 
that there would be no place for an inheritance.” 
 In the Lord’s due time His Spirit “wrought upon” Colum-
bus, the pilgrims, the Puritans, and others to come to Amer-
ica.  They testified of God’s intervention in their behalf.  
The Book of Mormon records that they humbled “them-
selves before the Lord; and the power of the Lord was with 
them.” 
 
 18. Samuel G. Freedman, Tea Party Rooted in Religious Fervor for Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 6, 2010, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/06/us/politics/ 
06religion.html. 
 19. Id. 
 20. CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA (1966). 
 21. Ezra Taft Benson, Our Divine Constitution, ENSIGN, Nov. 1987, at 4, available at 
http://www.lds.org/ldsorg/v/index.jsp?vgnextoid=2354fccf2b7db010VgnVCM1000004d8
2620aRCRD&locale=0&sourceId=632e79356427b010VgnVCM1000004d82620a_&hideNav
=1.  
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 Our Father in Heaven planned the coming forth of the 
Founding Fathers and their form of government as the ne-
cessary great prologue leading to the restoration of the gos-
pel.  Recall what our Savior Jesus Christ said nearly two thou-
sand years ago when He visited this promised land: “For it is 
wisdom in the Father that they should be established in this 
land, and be set up as a free people by the power of the Fa-
ther, that these things might come forth.”  America, the land 
of liberty, was to be the Lord’s latter-day base of operations 
for His restored church.22
If Mitt Romney rejects this view of the Constitution, he certainly has 
not said so.  And, it is worth noting, this is “constitutional redemption-
ism” on steroids. 
 
Such “constitutional faith” obviously requires rejecting the image 
of the Founding articulated a hundred years ago by Charles Beard, 
who viewed the Convention as a gathering of creditors and other 
property owners eager to protect their property against frustrated 
debtors.23  But it also requires equal rejection even of the label of-
fered by political scientist John Roche, that it was a “reform caucus in 
action,” with attendant grubby compromises.24  The most important 
such compromises involved slavery and what Madison termed the ne-
cessary “evil” of providing small states with representation in the Se-
nate equal to their significantly larger neighbors.25
It should, therefore, occasion no surprise that in early 2011 Har-
vard history professor Jill Lepore titled a piece in the New Yorker “The 
Commandments: The Constitution and its worshippers.”
    
26  If one 
“worships” the Constitution, then to express significant doubts about 
the value of the Constitution, as I most certainly do, is not only mista-
ken (which perhaps it is), but also blasphemous.  Instead, one can 
find even in a left-wing magazine like the Nation an attack on “Tea 
Party Constitutionalism” that concludes, “Ordinary Americans love 
the Constitution as least as much as far-right ideologues. It’s our Con-
stitution too. It’s time to take it back.”27
 
 22. Id. (citations omitted). 
 
 23. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1986) (1913). 
 24. John P. Roche, The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, 55 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 799 (1961). 
 25. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison). 
 26. Jill Lepore, The Commandments: The Constitution and Its Worshippers, NEW YORKER, 
Jan. 17, 2011, at 70. 
 27. Garrett Epps, Stealing the Constitution, NATION, Feb. 7, 2011, at 17, available at 
http://www.thenation.com/article/157904/stealing-constitution. 
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We should consider the possibility that that “love” is misplaced.  I 
believe that it is basically delusionary to “love” the Constitution—or to 
express particular faith in its current instantiation—unless one bene-
fits mightily from the status quo it tends to entrench and self-servingly 
wishes to keep it that way.  Otherwise, we’re all like deluded spouses 
who accept being battered as simply part of what the trials and tribu-
lations of marriage/politics are all about.  Ordinary Americans should 
learn that it is far past time to dispense with mindless love and time 
instead to engage in cold-blooded analysis, in which we ask a form of 
“what has the Constitution done for us lately?”  
Balkin is not in fact naïve in his embrace of the Constitution.  He 
is fully aware of the tragic aspects of American history within which 
the Constitution is embedded and, indeed, to which it mightily con-
tributed, including slavery.  Balkin is light years away from those de-
scribed by Thomas Jefferson as “men [who] look at constitutions with 
sanctimonious reverence and deem them like the ark of the covenant, 
too sacred to be touched.”28  Instead, Balkin, both in Constitutional Re-
demption and his other 2011 book Living Originalism, clearly believes in 
a more dynamic conception of the Constitution and presumably 
agrees with Jefferson that “institutions”—and the Constitutions that 
frame them—“must advance . . . and keep pace with the times.”29  Af-
ter all, as Jefferson observed, “We might as well require a man to wear 
still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to re-
main ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.”30
Still, it might fairly be said that the author of Constitutional Faith, 
twenty-five years ago, not only described the phenomenon but also 
professed at least some degree of the faith himself.   After all, I con-
cluded that book by setting up a highly concrete personal dilemma: 
will I add my own signature to the Constitution that was “on offer,” as 
it were, at the conclusion of the visit to the 1987 bicentennial exhibit 
in Philadelphia?
    
31  Every visitor was invited to emulate the Framers by 
adding his or her own signature to an endless scroll.  My answer, after 
some reflection, was yes.32
 
 28. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 10 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 37, 42 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899), available at 
http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id=JefLett.sgm&images=images/modeng& 
data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=244&division=div1. 
  The reason is quite simple: The reserva-
tions I had about the Constitution in 1987 concerned the degree to 
which the Constitution adequately protected certain important rights 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. LEVINSON, supra note 12, at 180. 
 32. Id. at 191–92. 
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and, of course, protected slavery.  William Lloyd Garrison had de-
scribed the Constitution as a “covenant with death and an agreement 
with hell.”33  Why should one affirm such a document?  The answer 
for me in 1987 was that Frederick Douglass, with Garrison the greatest 
abolitionist of his time, had broken with Garrison and declared that 
the Constitution, properly understood, was actually anti-slavery rather 
than pro-slavery.34  I decided that if the Constitution was good enough 
for Douglass, it should be good enough for me, however strained 
Douglass’s argument might be to conventionally well-trained law-
yers.35
But a book I published in 2006 began with the same dilemma 
and a different conclusion.
   
36  The new National Constitution Center 
in Philadelphia also invites its visitors to reaffirm the Constitution by 
adding their signatures to a similar scroll, and I demurred and re-
fused to do so in 2003, when the Center had its opening.  Why?  The 
answer is that in the intervening fifteen years, I became convinced 
that the rights provisions of the Constitution, however important, are 
in fact secondary to the parts of the Constitution that too often are 
ignored, whether by the legal academy or, for that matter, by most cit-
izens.  These are the parts that actually constitute the political system 
under which we live; they detail the operations of our basic institu-
tions and thus create the sclerotic political system that Friedman al-
most obsessively denounces.37
Another way of putting this is to say that the Constitution to 
which I was willing to affix my signature in 1987—and to accept as 
“my Constitution”—was what I have taken to calling in my most recent 
   
 
 33. Garrison used the phrase in a resolution he introduced before the Massachusetts 
Anti-Slavery Society in 1843: “That the compact which exists between the North and South 
is ‘a covenant with death, and an agreement with hell’—involving both parties in atrocious 
criminality; and should be immediately annulled.”  WALTER M. MERRILL, AGAINST WIND 
AND TIDE: A BIOGRAPHY OF WM. LLOYD GARRISON 205 (1963). 
 34. LEVINSON, supra note 12, at 192. 
 35. Balkin and I discuss Douglass’s speech setting out his theory of “anti-slavery consti-
tutionalism” in The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1998).  It also ap-
pears in the casebook of which he and I are two of the co-editors, with the intention, of 
course, that it be taught to, and discussed by, students being initiated into the modes of 
constitutional argument.  PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 253–57 (Paul Brest et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006). 
 36. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE 
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006) [herei-
nafter LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION]. 
 37. See supra text accompanying notes 7–9. 
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work “the Constitution of Conversation.”38  Consider only the “majes-
tic generalities,” to quote Justice Robert Jackson, that characterize the 
specific clauses of the United States Constitution that are the almost 
exclusive focus of lawyers, legal academics, and popular writers on the 
Constitution.  The best example is the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that was added at the conclusion of the con-
flagration of civil war.39
Still, the first thing that most people think of when they hear the 
word “constitution” is rights and the degree to which the Constitu-
tion—or courts interpreting the Constitution—in fact protect what 
one deems to be important rights.  Much of this can easily be unders-
tood as a response to the struggles of World War II and then the Cold 
War afterward, which were defined, simplistically or not, as the epic 
conflict between a culture that recognized the centrality of rights and 
totalitarian systems that by definition subordinated rights to the polit-
ical interests of those in power.  This, indeed, is how Justice Ginsburg 
thinks of constitutions, for what impresses her about the South Afri-
can constitution is its far greater acknowledgment than our own of 
the importance of international human rights.
  But the unamended Constitution also has 
more than enough texts that generate endless conversation about 
meaning, including, perhaps most prominently, Article I, Section 8, 
ostensibly detailing the powers of Congress, an obvious subject of 
great interest these days with regard to Congress’s power to invoke 
the Commerce Clause to justify the Affordable Care Act.   
40
Rights are not self-defining.  What I liked about the Constitution, 
and defined as my own “constitutional faith” circa 1987, was the invi-
tation to endless conversation about the nature of the American con-
stitutional project, particularly as set out in the Preamble, which I 
continue to find inspiring and the source—along with the Republican 
Form of Government Clause—of whatever redemptive vision might be 
contained within the 1787 Constitution.  Much of this endless conver-
sation involves the Bill of Rights, technically not a part of the original 
Constitution but added almost immediately afterward as fulfillment of 
the original “deal” made with some opponents of the Constitution, 
who centered their opposition on the lack of such explicit protection 
   
 
 38. See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF 
GOVERNANCE 23, 30 (2012) (stating that the Constitution of Conversation “involves consti-
tutional meaning”). 
 39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1  (“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 40. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
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of what were perceived as basic rights.  If one’s primary concern about 
the Constitution is the set of rights that it either guarantees or, at 
least, allows states and the United States to recognize, then I continue 
to believe that there is almost nothing in the Constitution that overtly 
invalidates the achievement of any plausible set of rights, whether one 
thinks of such things as a right to same-sex marriage or to universal 
medical care.   
To be sure, these rights may conflict, and we may well be politi-
cally divided with regard to the rights we actually support, but that is 
very different from pounding the table and saying that the Constitu-
tion simply won’t allow recognizing one’s favorite right or requires 
honoring some right that one regards as in fact awful.  So if rights 
continued to be my principal concern, I would continue to have (rela-
tively little) hesitation in re-signing the Constitution, even if I be-
wailed the unwillingness of one or another court, including the Su-
preme Court, to adopt my own favorite understanding of what rights 
are protected by the Constitution.  So I continue to follow the maxim, 
with regard to rights, that if the unamended Constitution was good 
enough for Frederick Douglass, then it’s good enough for me.  Thus 
my current worries about the Constitution—and my unwillingness ful-
ly to embrace it as “my” Constitution—have little to do with the for-
mal protection by the Constitution of whatever may be my favorite 
rights.   
Instead, I want to concentrate on what I am now labeling the 
“Constitution of Settlement,” which is altogether different from the 
Constitution of Conversation.  It is considerably more important in 
explaining the nature of the American political system—and its con-
temporary dysfunctionality that should worry every American.  The 
“majestic generalities” actually do relatively little to determine the 
specific courses taken by our polity with regard to the issues that most 
Americans care about with greatest intensity.  As University of Virginia 
law professor Frederick Schauer demonstrated in an important article 
in the Harvard Law Review, Gallup Poll after Gallup Poll has indicated 
that most Americans are worried far more, depending on the time a 
particular poll was taken, about the economy, the threats posed by 
terrorism, the state of American education, the deficit, and similar 
problems than about, say, the free-speech rights of high school stu-
dents or even affirmative action, same-sex marriage, abortion, or gun 
rights.41
 
 41. Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Foreword: The Court’s Agenda—
And the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2006). 
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The judiciary, when ostensibly “interpreting” the Constitution, 
has remarkably little to say, when all is said and done, about the first 
set of issues, save for interpreting statutes passed by Congress.  Even if 
the Supreme Court invalidates part or all of the Affordable Care Act, 
all one can say with confidence is that the American political system 
will have even greater opportunities to demonstrate its basic dysfunc-
tionality.  No one, after all, expects (or wants) the Court to issue a set 
of policies that it believes might fix our problematic and perhaps even 
bankruptcy-inducing medical care system.  
If one wants to understand why we have the medical care, envi-
ronmental, agricultural, or energy policies that we do, for example, 
one has to understand the way the American political system operates, 
not the arcana of what the Constitution “means” to well-trained law-
yers.  What is most important about the Constitution is like the pur-
loined letter for Edgar Allan Poe:42 It is there in clear sight, raising no 
problems as to disputed “meaning” but many, if only we would look, 
about wisdom.  These structural provisions of the Constitution, for bet-
ter and, I believe, very much for worse, make it nearly impossible to 
pass legislation that truly addresses the major problems of our time.  
Rather than recall an old-fashioned civics lesson in “how do bills be-
come laws?”, it is far better to ask “why do most bills have no chance 
of being seriously considered, let alone becoming law?”  Many factors 
surely go into explaining our complex system.  I do not deny the im-
portance of the corrosive role of money in elections43 or the rise of 
talk radio and cable news, not to mention the development of a pola-
rized party system that is near-unprecedented in our politics.44
 
 42. EDGAR ALLEN POE, THE PURLOINED LETTER (Philadelphia, Hart 1844). 
  My 
own contribution to this discussion, though, is to suggest, indeed to 
insist, that the Constitution of Settlement deserves far more attention 
than it receives.  It is the Constitution of Settlement that comprises 
those aspects of the Constitution that are remarkably nondynamic, 
that are not, as a matter of actual practice, amenable to the sometimes 
dazzling (or, to their opponents, dismaying) feats of “interpretation,” 
perhaps by adopting the method of “living originalism” that can ena-
 43. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, State for Sale: Art Pope’s Conquest of North Carolina, NEW YORKER, 
Oct. 10, 2011, at 90 (noting that since Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. 
Ct. 876 (2010), “an individual donor, particularly one with access to corporate funds, can 
play a significant, and sometimes decisive, role” in an election).  
 44. See, e.g., Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, Let’s Just Say It: The Republicans Are 
the Problem, WASH. POST, April 27, 2012 (“We have been studying Washington politics and 
Congress for more than 40 years, and never have we seen them this dysfunctional.”), avail-
able at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/lets-just-say-it-the-republicans-are-the-
problem/2012/04/27/gIQAxCVUlT_story.html. 
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ble the necessary adjustment of seeming constitutional verities to the 
demands of changing circumstances.45  It is the Constitution of Set-
tlement that creates the “vetogates” that Friedman laments (though, 
alas, does not truly confront).46
Consider only our form of bicameralism that, unlike many 
around the world, gives each house of Congress what I sometimes call 
a “death-ray veto” over anything passed by the other house.  They 
must agree on every dotted “i” and crossed “t” if a bill is to become a 
law.  But that’s not the end of the story.  A president who may well 
have taken office without the support of a majority of the electorate 
has the ability to negate any law that does overcome the formidable 
hurdles to passage set out by the Constitution.  Roughly 95 percent of 
the over 2,250 vetoes in our history have been upheld, given the diffi-
culty of procuring a two-thirds vote in each House that is necessary to 
override a presidential veto.
   
47  And, as we are seeing with the Supreme 
Court’s consideration of the Affordable Care Act,48 even passage by 
Congress and the signature of the President may not be enough, 
should a bare majority of five of the Justices—all, of course, readily 
identifiable as conservative Republicans—feel empowered to exercise 
their own veto power, which can be overcome only by constitutional 
amendment.49
 
 45. See generally JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). 
  That runs into the brute fact that the United States 
Constitution establishes overall the most difficult-to-amend constitu-
tion in the entire world, with its requirement that a proposal must be 
approved by two-thirds of each House of Congress and then ratified 
 46. See Friedman, supra note 7 (noting the frequency with which senatorial holds are 
being used to block executive branch appointments and how the use of filibuster has be-
come common practice).  James Fallows of The Atlantic, among others, has been waging a 
crusade to call attention to the increased use of the filibuster.  See, e.g., James Fallows, The 
Unspeakable F-Word, Government Style, THEATLANTIC.COM (Apr. 18, 2012, 1:02 PM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/the-unspeakable-f-word-government-
style/256051/ (“To my mind, the drastic recent lurch toward supermajority requirements 
for everything is deeply destructive, no matter which party is exerting this minority-
blocking role.”); see also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Senate: Out of Order?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 
1041 (2011) (arguing that the modern use of the filibuster has rendered the Senate essen-
tially broken).  
 47. LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 36, at 40. 
 48. Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2011), 
argued, No. 11-398 (S. Ct. Mar. 26, 2012). 
 49. By the time this Essay is published, readers will have the answer.  For what it is 
worth, my own prediction, as of May 21, 2012, is that the Court will in fact uphold the Act, 
whether because of Chief Justice Roberts’s and Justice Kennedy’s fidelity to well-
established precedent or because of a prudential judgment, particularly by the Chief Jus-
tice, that a 5-4 decision striking it down would do immense damage to the Court’s institu-
tional reputation and perhaps even tarnish its legitimacy among significant elements of 
the American polity.   
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by three-fourths of the fifty states.50  And, inasmuch as forty-nine of 
the fifty states are themselves bicameral, this means that it is necessary 
to get the support of at least seventy-five separate state legislative 
houses (assuming one of the ratifying states is Nebraska) in order to 
ratify an amendment, while an amendment fails, as did the Equal 
Rights Amendment in the 1970s,51
In many ways, my own personal mantra regarding the Constitu-
tion, as of 2012, is taken from Chief Justice John Marshall’s famous 
opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland
 should its opponents garner sup-
port in only thirteen houses in separate states. 
52 and his reminder that “we must 
never forget, that it is a Constitution we are expounding.”53  Justice Fe-
lix Frankfurter once wrote that this was “the single most important ut-
terance in the literature of constitutional law—most important be-
cause most comprehensive and comprehending.”54  I confess that I 
was long mystified by what seemed clear hyperbole even from Frank-
furter.  I have come to believe, though, that what justifies Frankfur-
ter’s otherwise irrational exuberance is what follows several para-
graphs later, when Chief Justice Marshall sets out what is most 
important about the legal documents we call constitutions.  He em-
phasizes that the United States Constitution is “intended to endure 
for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises 
of human affairs.”55  The point is that John Marshall recognized that 
the United States Constitution had to be a “living Constitution” (a 
term that, of course, he did not use) if it was to achieve the most fun-
damental purpose of “endur[ing] for ages to come.”  In this belief, he 
was a faithful disciple of his despised adversary Thomas Jefferson and 
his emphasis on institutions “keep[ing] pace with the times.”56  Such 
adaptation is surely an important part of our constitutional history.  
This is presumably what Oliver Wendell Holmes meant by emphasiz-
ing that “the life of the law” was “experience” or what he called “[t]he 
felt necessities of the time”57
 
 50. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 rather than responses to the ostensible 
 51. For a history of the Equal Rights Amendment, see RENEE FEINBERG, THE EQUAL 
RIGHTS AMENDMENT (1986). 
 52. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 53. Id. at 407. 
 54. Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON 
THE SUPREME COURT: EXTRAJUDICIAL ESSAYS ON THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 534 
(Philip B. Kurland ed., 1970). 
 55. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415. 
 56. See supra note 28. 
 57. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Little, Brown & Co. 1945) 
(1881) (“The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intui-
tions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with 
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demands of cold “logic.”  But no one should believe that our constitu-
tional history consists only of such happy (or, if one is opposed, un-
happy) adaptation as part of the continuing conversation about con-
stitutional meaning. 
It is vital that we recognize the static, decidedly nonadaptive as-
pects of our constitutional history, imposed by the Constitution of 
Settlement, which has proved remarkably impervious to adaptation.  
Thus, for every “majestic generality” like Equal Protection of the Laws, 
there are clear textual commands controlling the distribution of pow-
er in the United States Senate (each state gets an identical two 
votes);58 the way we select our president (the Electoral College);59 
when we inaugurate the winner (January 20, thanks to the Twentieth 
Amendment);60 and how long he or she serves (exactly four years, not 
one day more or less, save for the possibility of impeachment, death, 
or resignation).61
This is why I began my 2006 book, Our Undemocratic Constitution: 
Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (and How We the People Can Correct It), 
by detailing my reasons for refusing to sign the scroll in Philadelphia.  
Many of those reasons, as suggested by the book’s title, related to the 
fact that the United States Constitution is in many ways remarkably 
undemocratic, not only when compared to almost any constitution 
written around the world since the end of World War II, but also 
when compared to the fifty state constitutions within the United 
States.   
  Worst of all, from my perspective, may be Article V, 
the Amendment Clause.  By making it functionally impossible to 
amend the Constitution with regard to anything controversial, Article 
V stultifies, indeed infantilizes, our politics both directly and indirect-
ly.  Directly, it makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to en-
gage in fundamental adaptations that would allow us to respond ade-
quately to the challenges facing us as a society.  The indirect effect is 
to make discussion of constitutional change almost unavoidably 
sound quixotic (or worse) precisely because almost any sober analyst 
knows that the possibility of achieving such change is close to zero. 
The United States, under both Democratic and Republican pres-
idents, declares its support for what I have come to call the “democra-
cy project” around the world.  We should reflect far more than we do 
 
their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the 
rules by which men should be governed.”). 
 58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
 59. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 60. U.S. CONST. amend. XX. 
 61. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 970 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:956 
on the fact that the United States, at least so far as the national gov-
ernment is concerned, scarcely meets the twenty-first century criteria 
of democratic rule.  This is why Friedman could seriously suggest that 
the United States might need its own “springtime” of democracy.62
That being said, I have also come to believe that most Americans 
are in fact indifferent to the democratic bona fides of their national 
government.  I was reminded by many critics that the United States 
was never intended to be a “democracy” and that I was making a basic 
category mistake in criticizing it for failing to be one.  Many people 
who would never dream of associating with the John Birch Society 
were happy to repeat some version of its motto—“America is a repub-
lic, not a democracy, and let’s keep it that way.”  So the fact that I lost 
my own faith because of the failure of the United States Constitution 
to be sufficiently democratic may mean only that I am too “academic” 
in my approach to the Constitution and insufficiently appreciative of 
its benefits.  After all, Barack Obama, as a candidate in 2008, said of 
the Constitution that “it’s worked pretty well for over 200 years,”
   
63 
which, among other things, requires ignoring a brutal civil war that 
killed, according to the latest estimates, 750,000 Americans.64 More to 
the point, that war was fundamentally caused by the Constitution it-
self, whose emphasis on exclusively geographically-based representa-
tion in the House and Senate helped to assure the creation, in the 
1850s, of a Union (or what Lincoln called the “House”)  divided 
against itself that could indeed not stand.65
So forget the fact that the Constitution is woefully undemocratic.  
Instead, we should be aware that the Constitution of Settlement in-
  I would like to think that 
then-candidate Obama was simply engaging in opportunistic rhetoric, 
given that almost literally the last thing he could afford to be per-
ceived as was a critic of our sacred foundational text.  But perhaps he 
even meant what he said, which would be more discouraging 
(though, alas, fully congruent with the way American constitutional 
law is taught in our leading law schools like Harvard).  
 
 62. Friedman, supra note 7. 
 63. Peter Nicholas, Obama’s Message Gets a Lot Louder, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2008, at 
A10.  In fairness, Obama was defending habeas corpus against attacks by vice presidential 
candidate Sarah Palin. 
 64. See Guy Gugliotta, New Estimate Raises Civil War Death Toll, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2012, 
at D1 (reporting that credible new research, using Census data, estimates that 750,000 
Americans died in the Civil War, up from previous estimates of 618,000), available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/science/civil-war-toll-up-by-20-percent-in-new-
estimate.html?pagewanted=all. 
 65. See especially MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
EVIL (2006).   
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creasingly constitutes a clear and present danger to our polity precise-
ly because of the role it plays in leading most Americans, altogether 
correctly, to have less and less confidence in their basic national insti-
tutions of governance.  How many readers, for example, agree with 
the majority of polled Americans that the country is going in the 
wrong direction and that the political system is proving inadequate to 
engage in necessary turns of course, whatever your own major issues 
of concern might be?  Twenty-five years ago, I wrote that “[m]y refusal 
to sign the Constitution would require a much deeper alienation from 
American life and politics than I can genuinely feel (or, indeed, have 
ever felt).”66
Obviously, there is no agreement on what particular turns of pol-
icy might help to alleviate the sense of America going in the wrong di-
rection.  Members of the Tea Party have quite different agendas from, 
say, the 2008 supporters of President Obama who were looking for 
“Change We Can Believe In.”  But the point is that remarkably few 
people these days look at the contemporary United States govern-
ment, which is structured by the Constitution, with any genuine affec-
tion.  An averaging of polls conducted in late April–early May 2012 
reveals that only 14 percent of Americans “approve” of Congress, 
while a full 78 percent “disapprove.”
  I would not really describe myself in 2012 as alienated 
from American life.  But how can any thinking person not be funda-
mentally alienated from important aspects of our contemporary poli-
tics that seem designed to create a sense of inefficacy and irrelevance, 
unless one is supported by one or another billionaire with special 
access to the levers of power?  
67  This actually represents a slight 
uptick in approval, given that a New York Times article on September 
16, 2011, was headlined “Approval of Congress Matches Record Low” 
of 12 percent.68  Similarly, the Gallup organization reported during 
the same month that “Americans Express Historic Negativity Toward 
U.S. Government,” noting that 81 percent of those polled were “dissa-
tisfied” with the way the country is being governed.69
 
 66. LEVINSON, supra note 
  Perhaps most 
shocking was an August 2011 Rasmussen poll finding that only 17 
12, at 192. 
 67. See Congressional Job Approval, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (a rolling average of polls on 
Congressional approval), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/congressional_ 
job_approval-903.html (last viewed May 14, 2012). 
 68. Allison Kopicki, Approval of Congress Matches Record Low, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2011, 
7 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/16/approval-of-congress-matches-
record-low/. 
 69. Lydia Saad, Americans Express Historic Negativity Toward U.S. Government, GALLUP 
(Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/149678/americans-express-historic-
negativity-toward-government.aspx. 
 972 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:956 
percent of those surveyed said that the present national government 
actually possesses the consent of the governed.70
Americans are currently remarkably distrustful of their basic in-
stitutions, save, for better or worse, the military, which enjoys the sig-
nificant confidence of 78 percent of the public.
   
71
 Expressions about the “dysfunctionality” or even “pathology” of 
the American political system have become a staple of contemporary 
punditry.  Even Standard & Poor’s, when downgrading American debt 
from AAA to AA status last year, wrote that “the downgrade reflects 
our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of Ameri-
can policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of 
ongoing fiscal and economic challenges.”
  One wonders if so 
few Americans, had we been able to poll them in 1776, would have 
expressed approval of or confidence in the British Parliament of King 
George III.  Many colonists gave their lives to defend His Majesty’s 
realm against those they thought were treasonous revolutionaries, and 
many more became refugees from what had been their homeland by 
moving to Canada and elsewhere.   
72
 So after praising Friedman for his diagnosis of America’s parlous 
condition, let me offer some severe criticism of his advice for over-
coming that condition.  In Friedman’s recent best-seller, co-authored 
with Michael Mandelbaum, That Used to Be Us: How America Fell Behind 
in the World It Invented and How We Can Come Back, we find the state-
ment that “[F]or America’s remarkable history the Constitution de-
serves a large share of the credit.”
  What is missing, though, 
is an ability to “connect the dots” between our “institutions” and the 
Constitution that created them.   
73
 
 70. New Low: 17% Say U.S. Government Has Consent of the Governed, RASMUSSEN REPORTS 
(Aug. 7, 2011), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general 
_politics/august_2011/new_low_17_say_u_s_government_has_consent_of_the_governed. 
  Although Friedman and Mandel-
baum call for “shock therapy” to alleviate what they call the 
 71. Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP (June 9–12, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/ 
poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx (finding that 78 percent of Americans have “a 
great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the military, while a remaining 16 percent 
have at least “some” confidence).  Contrast this with Congress, in which only 6 percent of 
the public has “a great deal” of confidence, while another 6 percent musters “quite a lot” 
of confidence.  To be sure, another 40 percent have “some” confidence in Congress, but 
this still leaves Congress a full 42 points behind the military, whereas the gap is 66 points if 
one looks only at the “great deal” and “quite a lot” measures.   
 72. United States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered to ‘AA+’ Due to Political Risks, Rising 
Debt Burden; Outlook Negative, STANDARD & POOR’S (Aug. 5 2011, 20:13 EST), 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?assetID=1245316529563.  
 73. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN & MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THAT USED TO BE US: HOW 
AMERICA FELL BEHIND IN THE WORLD IT INVENTED AND HOW WE CAN COME BACK 33 
(2011). 
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“pathologies” of contemporary American politics, they also write that 
the country does not “need fundamental changes to its system of gov-
ernment, a system that has served it well for more than two centuries 
and has proven equal to task of coping with a series of major chal-
lenges.”74
These benign assertions exemplify a totally unreflective “constitu-
tional faith” that ignores even the possibility that the Constitution, 
whatever its acknowledged benefits, might have significant costs as 
well.  Instead, we are invited to imagine that the Constitution of 1787, 
left remarkably unchanged since then with regard to our basic institu-
tional structures, is essentially perfect.  Friedman is often extremely 
incisive when he writes of the difficulties posed by their respective 
constitutions for such countries as Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, 
or Turkey.
   
75
Justice Ginsburg is the better guide, though it is essential to sup-
plement her emphasis on rights, however understandable given her 
own background as perhaps the leading legal advocate for women’s 
rights in our history.  Would that she had also reminded her Egyptian 
listeners to be wary of the structural provision of the Constitution of 
Settlement.  Perhaps the greatest irony is that some of the Framers 
might have applauded Justice Ginsburg’s critical spirit (and, thus, I 
even hope, my own critiques of their handiwork).  They were more 
clearheaded, in many ways, than many of us today with regard to the 
merits (and demerits) of the Constitution.  Begin with the fact that 
they ruthlessly dispensed with our first constitution, the Articles of 
Confederation, because it was viewed as thoroughly dysfunctional.  
Indeed, Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 15 referred to the 
“imbecility” of the political system given us by the Articles.
  It is only when he turns to his own country that his acuity 
seems to disappear in favor of general denunciations of our political 
system as if it had nothing to do with the Constitution that gave it 
form.   
76
 
 74. Id. at. 331. 
  One may 
not have to go quite that far in describing our contemporary polity, 
but Hamilton’s language should, at the least, be bracing with regard 
to the way a genuine patriot responded to what he viewed as the crisis 
of American government in 1787.  I never fail to be inspired by the 
 75. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., Getting to Know You . . . , N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 
2012, at SR11 (stating that “for Egypt to have a democratic revolution—a real change in 
the power structure and institutions—all these newly empowered parties will have to find a 
way to work together to produce a new constitution and a new president”).  
 76. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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closing words of James Madison in The Federalist No. 14, where he 
described as  
the glory of the people of America, that, whilst they have 
paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and 
other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for 
antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the sugges-
tions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own 
situation, and the lessons of their own experience . . .  Had 
no important step been taken by the leaders of the Revolu-
tion for which a precedent could not be discovered, no gov-
ernment established of which an exact model did not 
present itself, the people of the United States might, at this 
moment have been numbered among the melancholy vic-
tims of misguided councils, must at best have been laboring 
under the weight of some of those forms which have crushed 
the liberties of the rest of mankind.77
For all of Madison’s emphasis on the importance of ratifying the 
document that emerged from Philadelphia, he emphasized as well 
that “it is incumbent on their successors to improve and perpetuate” 
it.
  
78
So, whatever my status as a member of the “constitutional faith 
community” in 1987, I am quite confident that I have left that particu-
lar church (or temple).  I suppose, if one wishes to continue using the 
kinds of religious terminology that structured Constitutional Faith, that 
I have become a proponent of quite radical “reformation.”  I believe 
we can achieve the promise of American constitutionalism as set out 
in the Preamble, which does deserve our commitment, only by sub-
stantially changing the institutions that systematically work against the 
possibility of actually achieving the goals the Preamble sets out.  Even 
if this is not the occasion for the symbolic nailing of my own “95 thes-
es” specifying the particularities of my critique of the Constitution, I 
share some of the impulses that led Martin Luther to act as he did in 
sparking an earlier Reformation.    
  Almost none of the critics of contemporary American politics, 
like Friedman, are even willing to consider what we might do to “im-
prove” the Constitution. 
I confess that my fondest hope—which I realize is likely to be un-
realized—is that Americans come to recognize the need for a new 
constitutional convention that could, over a period of perhaps two 
years, give adequate study and thought to what kinds of institutions 
 
 77. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison). 
 78. Id. 
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are truly needed in the twenty-first century if we are to endure as a so-
ciety that we want our children and, for many of us, grandchildren to 
inherit and inhabit.  Is such a call for a new convention “un-
American”?  Were we talking about “the other 50 constitutions,” 
whose importance I think we should recognize far more than we do, 
we would realize that the answer is a decided “No.”  Constitutional 
change is as American as apple pie, at least if we look at the states.  
Maryland, for example, is one of fourteen states whose constitutions 
specify that the electorate will be given the opportunity at stated in-
tervals, usually twenty years, to vote on whether to have a new state 
constitutional convention.79  Interestingly enough, a majority of Mary-
landers who voted on the issue in 2010 supported a new convention, 
but apparently a majority of the entire electorate is required,80 and 
enough Marylanders who voted in the gubernatorial contest blanked 
their ballots with regard to the convention to turn the 54 percent ma-
jority of actual voters into only a 48 percent plurality of the entire 
electorate that turned out to vote in November 2010.81
Ohio will be voting on whether to have a new state constitutional 
convention this November,
 
82 as did Montana, Iowa, Michigan, and 
Maryland in 2010.  There have been over 225 such state constitutional 
conventions in our history;83
What I discover, from talking with my closest friends and family, 
as well as academic colleagues, students, and even strangers to whom I 
sometimes give talks like the one from which this Essay is derived, is 
that most people are horrified by the prospect of a new convention, 
whether at the state or, especially, the national level.  The reason, I be-
 most of the states have in fact replaced 
earlier constitutions with ones they believed were more suited to new 
times.  I strongly hope that Ohioans will vote for a new convention, 
not least because they could demonstrate to the country that it is in 
fact possible to conduct such a fundamental inquiry into the adequacy 
of the existing constitution, its second, dating back to 1851 (albeit 
with over 150 amendments since then). 
 
 79. MD. CONST. art. XIV, § 2. 
 80. See id. (noting that a “majority of voters at such election” is required for a conven-
tion to be approved). 
 81. In counting the entire electorate, 48 percent were in favor of a constitutional con-
vention, 40 percent opposed, and 12 percent abstained.  See 2010 General Election Official 
Results, MARYLAND STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS (Dec. 1, 2010, 4:26 PM), http:// 
www.elections.state.md.us/elections/2010/results/General/StateQuestions_question_1.ht
ml. 
 82. OHIO CONST. art. XVI, § 3. 
 83. JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 7 (2006) (stat-
ing there have been 233 state constitutional conventions between 1776 and 2005). 
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lieve, is that most people in the United States today basically do not 
trust their fellow citizens.  We are increasingly likely to view them as 
ominous strangers who would, given half a chance, fundamentally 
change the country for the worse.  The left has this image of those in 
the Tea Party, and, as I discovered at a gathering at the Harvard Law 
School co-sponsored by the Law School and the Tea Party Patriots, 
Tea Partiers are equally convinced that the left would inevitably take 
over a convention and further destroy the country as the right im-
agines it to be.  
One’s response to this Essay might well take a different form 
from what I expect if readers were willing to say that our present insti-
tutions are working just fine and merit approval that is unaccountably 
lacking among the overwhelming majority of contemporary Ameri-
cans.  But, frankly, that is not the case.84
I beg to disagree.  I believe that the Constitution has saddled us 
with a fundamentally defective political system.  I take cold comfort in 
the title of a new book by two Washington insiders, Thomas Mann of 
the Brookings Institution and Norman Ornstein of the American En-
terprise Institute, It’s Even Worse than It Looks: How the American Consti-
tutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism.
  Instead, I suspect that the 
case against me boils down to a version of “it isn’t so broken that it 
needs to be fixed through the extraordinarily scary process of a new 
constitutional convention.”   
85  This is a suc-
cessor to their earlier book, The Broken Branch, about Congress.86
A good friend who is a distinguished psychiatrist once told me 
that there can sometimes be great benefits to the psychological me-
chanism of denial.  I am sure that is often the case, especially about 
things we cannot really fix.  There is a certain logic, perhaps, to think-
ing that if things can’t be fixed, then they are not really broken, since the al-
ternative is too awful to contemplate.  Perhaps the worst thing about 
our political system is that the sheer stumbling blocks placed in the 
way of remedying its dysfunctionalities tempt us to conclude that 
things really aren’t so bad after all.  We’ve muddled through in the 
   
 
 84. See Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP (June 9–12, 2011) (finding that 37 percent of 
Americans have confidence in the Supreme Court, 35 percent have confidence in the 
presidency, and 12 percent have confidence in Congress), http://www.gallup.com/ 
poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx. 
 85. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF 
EXTREMISM (2012). 
 86. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS 
IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK (2006). 
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past—with only one civil war that killed almost 3 percent of the entire 
population—and we’ll do so in the future.  
But not even the United States Constitution is completely imper-
vious to change, at least if an aroused citizenry demands, in the spirit 
of Thomas Jefferson, a new suit of clothes better suited to an age of 
global warming.  For better and for worse, the Tea Party has provided 
a model of engaged citizenship, which includes, for all of their exag-
gerated reverence for the Constitution, calls for constitutional 
amendment.  I have no hesitation in opposing their particular sugges-
tions, including, for example, repealing the Seventeenth Amendment 
and returning to the selection of senators by state legislatures.87
I concluded my latest book, Framed,
  But I 
commend them for in fact being willing and able to “connect the 
dots” and realizing that there may be some relationship between the 
institutions constructed by the Constitution and the actualities of 
American politics.  To condemn Tea Partiers for the very suggestion 
that our sacred Constitution might need some changes is to manifest 
the worst kind of “constitutional faith.”  It betrays not only what is best 
in our own political heritage, but, even worse, condemns those who 
will come after us to ever greater alienation from a political system 
they rightly view as unable to respond to the great challenges of our 
times.   
88 with acknowledgments.  Af-
ter mentioning many people who directly contributed to the ideas 
and writing of the book, I mentioned my three grandchildren, Rebec-
ca, Ella, and the recently-born Sarah.  None made a direct contribu-
tion, but all “deserve recognition, nonetheless, as splendid people.  
Moreover, they are truly the source of my passion concerning what I 
call in the title the ‘crisis of governance’ in contemporary America 
and the role played, if only marginally, by the fifty-one constitutions 
within the United States in making it more difficult to resolve the 
problems that will dominate their futures.  They deserve better.”89
 
 87. See, e.g., Todd Zywicki, Repeal the Seventeenth Amendment, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE 
(Nov. 10, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/252825/repeal-
seventeenth-amendment-todd-zywicki# (explaining Tea Party arguments for repealing the 
Seventeenth Amendment). 
  All 
of our families—as well as the strangers with whom we are connected 
as fellow citizens and inhabitants of the United States, not to mention 
strangers around the world who are affected by decisions made (or 
not made) by the United States government—deserve better.   
 88. SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF 
GOVERNANCE (2012). 
 89. Id. at 400. 
